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1 
TWITTER, PARODY, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO 
TWITTER PARODY DEFAMATION 
Emma Lux* 
Twitter parody defamation cases raise novel questions about how to 
translate defamation law to Twitter’s interactive platform.  What consti-
tutes a “reasonable” reader on Twitter?  What content is relevant to inter-
preting the meaning of a tweet from a parody account?  The answers to 
these questions will have far-reaching effects for online speech.  Parody au-
thors are already vulnerable to defamation liability, particularly on Twitter 
where their statements often appear with very little context.  Twitter parody 
accounts, which produce important political and social commentary, risk 
defamation lawsuits, as well as, in some states, criminal liability for online 
impersonation.  This Note proposes a methodology for interpreting the de-
famatory meaning of a tweet that the author intended as parody. It argues 
for a contextual approach that aligns with First Amendment principles and 










                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Georgetown University Law Center.  The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Erin Carroll for her support and insightful feedback.  She is also grateful to the editors 
of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their comments and assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[C]elebrating a week-long anniversary with Twitter and no #lawsuits 
for #defamation, #slander, #libel, or #tortiousinterference!”1   
In 2014, a college student created a Twitter account named Todd 
Levitt 2.0 to parody his professor, Todd Levitt.2  The parody account’s 
handle3 was “@levittlawyer”4 and its biography section (“bio”)5 stated that 
it was a “badass parody on our favorite lawyer.”6  The student made the ac-
count to mock the professor’s own personal account, in which Todd Levitt 
represented himself as a “badass lawyer,” and tweeted statements like how 
he “‘tore it up’” in his university days and how he once served alcohol to 
his current students.7  
The parody account lampooned Levitt by making references to party-
ing and drinking, calling into question his competency as a lawyer.8  One 
tweet stated, “‘Buying me a drink at Cabin Karaoke will get you extra 
[credit], but it’s not like that matters because you are guaranteed an A in 
                                                          
1. @levittlawyer, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:56 PM), https://twitter.com/levittlawyer
/status/458801512182214656 [https://archive.is/ofQnc] (tweeting from the Levitt 2.0 parody ac-
count). 
2. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2016); 
see @levittlawyer, supra note 1.  
3. Leslie Walker, Twitter Language: Twitter Slang and Key Terms Explained, LIFEWIRE 
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com/twitter-slang-and-key-terms-explained-2655399, 
[https://perma.cc/5HGZ-VLK6]. (describing how Twitter handles are short phrases selected by 
users to describe their accounts). 
4. @levittlawyer, supra note 1. 
5. Amanda MacArthur, What Does the Bio Mean on Twitter?, LIFEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.lifewire.com/twitter-bio-definition-3289021, [https://perma.cc/3LHA-MG8T] (Twit-
ter users typically use the bio to “give others a short intro about who [they] are…”); 
@levittlawyer, supra note 1.  
6. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.  
7. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *1.  
8. Id. 
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[the] syllabus.’”9  Another said, “What’s the difference between the inter-
net and my tweeted legal advice? A: none. They’re both 100% accurate!”10  
When Todd Levitt found the parody account, he sued the student in 
Michigan state court for defamation.11  The court in Levitt v. Felton 
(“Levitt”) held that the parody account tweets were nondefamatory parody 
protected by the First Amendment.12  Because the tweets demeaned the le-
gal and academic professions and employed “rhetorical hyperbole,” the 
court concluded that they could not reasonably be understood as coming 
from a college professor.13  Additionally, “[w]hen read in context” of the 
account’s name and disclaimer tweets from the same account, the court 
found that the tweets were nondefamatory.14  The account’s name, “Levitt 
2.0,” weighed toward parody, the court reasoned, since it “hints at the no-
tion that [the account] is a spoof.”15  And the account’s periodic posting of 
“disclaimer” tweets heavily favored the conclusion that the tweets were not 
defamatory.16  
Other state and federal courts have considered similar factors as the 
Levitt court when analyzing whether tweets, or other similar social media 
posts,17 are defamatory.  For example, courts have considered whether the 




12. Id. at *3. 
13. Id.  Defamation is the intentional publication of a statement of fact which is false, un-
privileged, and which causes special damage or has a natural tendency to injure reputation.  
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.8 (2d ed. 2020).  
14. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3. 
15. Id.  
 16. Id. (“[T]he idea that the tweets were a parody is soundly reinforced by [the account’s] 
several disclaimers . . . including one that says, ‘This is a parody account. You can find the real 
[Todd Levitt] @levittlaw.’”). 
 17. Because there have been so few Twitter defamation cases that specifically involve 
parody and have resulted in published opinions, see, e.g., id. at *1.  This Note refers to some cas-
es involving different social media websites when the relevant features are analogizable to fea-
tures on Twitter.  It also addresses cases involving Twitter and defamation, but not parody specif-
ically.  
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name of an account that allegedly posted a defamatory statement hints at 
parody18 or not,19 as was the case in Levitt.20  Courts have also considered 
context such as the posting account’s bio,21 profile picture,22 use of Twitter 
as a medium,23 and the informal nature of internet speech24 as part of the 
determination of whether tweets are defamatory.  Some courts have looked 
to extrinsic, actual events surrounding the allegedly defamatory tweet to 
interpret the statement in context,25 while other courts consider only the 
language of the tweet itself.26  
But what exactly is the appropriate context in which to analyze an al-
legedly defamatory tweet, and when does that context translate as parody to 
a reasonable reader?  Answering these questions has proven difficult even 
in traditional media, as courts struggle to articulate the average reader’s in-
terpretative capabilities.27  The choice of Twitter as a medium raises addi-
                                                          
18. O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F. Supp. 3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that a post on 
the social media website Disqus from a parody account named Knotty the Tramp was not defama-
tory since the account’s name indicated the account was parody to the reasonable reader).  
19. White v. Ortiz, No. 13–cv–251–SM, 2015 WL 5331279, at *5 (D.N.H. Sept. 14, 
2015) (finding a tweet from a fake Twitter account called “The Real June White” defamatory 
since the account’s name did not indicate that the account was intended as parody). 
20. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3. 
21. See, e.g., TRG Motorsports, LLC v. Media Barons, LLC, No. B244937, 2013 WL 
5428769, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding statements from a website and associated Twitter 
parody account non-defamatory when the website included biographical information, similar to a 
Twitter bio, describing the parodied individual as a “little person” named “Devin Fuckler”). 
22. See, e.g., O’Donnell, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 301–02 (finding a post from a Disqus account 
nondefamatory when its profile picture featured an unflattering image of the subject of the parody 
account drinking from a bottle of alcohol). 
23. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 342 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (describing 
how speech on Twitter is “rife with vague and simplistic insults”). 
24. See, e.g., Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014). 
25. See, e.g., Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342 (“[T]he . . . context of defendants’ [allegedly 
defamatory tweet] is the familiar back and forth between a political commentator and the subject 
of her criticism[] and . . . the Republican presidential primary”). 
26. See, e.g., Winter v. Pinkins, No. 14–cv–8817, 2017 WL 5496278, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 17, 2017) (finding that a tweet is defamatory based solely on the language of the tweet 
alone). 
27. See infra, Part II. 
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tional questions regarding how to determine whether a tweet, when read in 
context, is protected parody or not.28  
Furthermore, criminal and civil liabilities that threaten to chill core 
First Amendment speech29 hang in the balance of this discussion.  A new 
wave of laws criminalizing online impersonation, or “e-personation”30 pro-
hibit “credibly” impersonating a person to cause “harm.”31  While the laws 
are aimed at penalizing actions such as cyberbullying and catfishing,32 crit-
ics argue that these laws may impermissibly sweep up protected parody ac-
counts in their enforcement.33  Parody authors often imitate their subject to 
criticize the individual,34 which could be interpreted as intent to cause 
“harm.”35  Additionally, Twitter parody authors that critique politicians36 or 
                                                          
28. See Patrick H. Hunt, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Def-
amation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559, 562 (2013) (describing how to apply existing 
defamation law to Twitter defamation cases).  
29. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–56 (1988) (describing 
parody as core First Amendment speech). 
30. E-personation is the act of “impersonat[ing] someone online in order to ‘harm’ that 
person.”  See Corynne McSherry, “E-Personification” Bill Could Be Used to Punish Online Crit-
ics, Undermine First Amendment Protections for Parody, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 22, 
2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/08/e-personation-bill-could-be-used-punish-online 
[https://perma.cc/73NY-YCZ8]; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2020). 
31. PENAL § 528.5. 
32. See, e.g., Antonella Santi, “Catfishing”: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. v. Canadian 
Catfishing Laws and Their Limitations, 44 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 73, 78 (2019) (describing how “Cat-
fishing takes two primary forms: (1) obtaining another individual[’]s information without consent 
to gain access to their online profile or impersonating them by creating a fake profile; or (2) creat-
ing an entirely fictitious profile”). 
33. McSherry, supra note 30 (arguing that California’s online impersonation statute may 
squelch online “political activism”). 
34. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 54 (describing how famous American car-
toonist Thomas Nast portrayed William “Boss” Tweed in satirical cartoons that constituted a 
“sustained attack” on the politician). 
35. See McSherry, supra note 30 (describing how impersonating a person online to “em-
barrass” them may be interpreted as causing “harm” under the e-personation state laws). 
36. See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-1715, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 at *1–2 (Va. 
Cir. June 24, 2020). 
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other public figures37 currently face civil liability that threatens to chill 
speech regarding matters of public interest. 
As a result, it is critical to develop an administrable methodology to 
determine whether allegedly defamatory tweets are protected parody.  This 
Note anticipates a path forward.  It first describes the approaches courts use 
in traditional media when determining whether a parody statement is de-
famatory.38  Then, this Note shifts to the Twitter context, describing how 
courts have analyzed allegedly defamatory parody tweets.39  Finally, this 
Note proposes a method for determining whether parody tweets are defam-
atory by drawing from the traditional media analysis.40  By interpreting 
tweets reasonably and in the appropriate context, courts can maintain prop-
er First Amendment protections41 for Twitter parody accounts. 
II. DEFAMATORY MEANING AND PARODY IN TRADITIONAL MEDIA  
Defamation is the intentional publication of a statement of fact which 
is false, unprivileged, and which causes special damage or has a natural 
tendency to injure reputation.42  A statement has a natural tendency to di-
minish reputation when it lowers the esteem in which a person is held, such 
as a statement which implies that a college wrestling coach committed per-
                                                          
37. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief, Block v. Schulte, No. EC067254, 2019 WL 
4477437, at *8, appeal docketed, No. B297198 (Cal. Ct. App., April 29, 2019) (discussing a def-
amation lawsuit against a Twitter parody account that criticized a well-known Los Angeles evic-
tion attorney for harming impoverished tenants). 
38. See infra Part II. 
39. See infra Part III. 
40. See infra Part IV. 
41. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (explaining how parody 
has played a “prominent” role in American political debate and represents core First Amendment 
speech). 
42. SMOLLA, supra note 13, § 1.8.  A false statement of fact, for example, could occur if 
an author “attribute[d] an untrue factual assertion to the speaker.”  See, e.g., Masson v. New 
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991) (describing how “[a]n example [of a false 
statement] would be a fabricated quotation of a public official admitting he had been convicted of 
a serious crime when in fact he had not”). This article focuses on defamation where there are no 
special damages, and the plaintiff must prove that a statement is reasonably susceptible to a de-
famatory meaning in order to recover. 
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jury.43  Because defamation requires a statement of fact, a statement cannot 
be defamatory if it cannot be “reasonably . . . understood as describing ac-
tual facts . . . or . . . events . . . .”44  In other words, a statement cannot be 
defamatory when a reasonable reader would understand that the statement, 
when read in its ordinary context, is parody, not factual information.45  For 
example, the Supreme Court has found that a parody advertisement por-
traying a well-known minister and his mother as “drunk and immoral,” was 
clearly parody in light of a parody disclaimer stating, “ad parody—not to 
be taken seriously.”46  As a result, the statement could not support the 
award of damages “consistently with the First Amendment.”47 
This proposition—that statements must be understood as allegations 
of facts in order to be defamatory—could at first glance seem to exclude 
statements like parody from liability.  Parodies, when understood as satiri-
cal by their intended audiences, convey the message that they are not false 
statements of fact.48  However, the defamatory meaning analysis does not 
hinge on the meaning intended by the author.49  Rather, the relevant ques-
tion is whether “a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement[] 
. . . impl[ies] an assertion [of fact].”50  As a result, it is possible for an au-
thor to intend to create a parody and nonetheless produce a statement with 
                                                          
43. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 7 (1990) (describing a defamation 
lawsuit in which a wrestling coach alleged injury to “his lifetime occupation of coach and teach-
er” as a result of statements that accused him of the crime of perjury). 
44. See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 49.  
45. See id. at 57 (holding that a defendant may not recover from a parody that could not 
be understood as alleging false statements of fact). 
46. Id. at 48 (Hustler Magazine was a case flowing from the Supreme Court’s defamation 
line of First Amendment cases); see generally LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: 
JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. 
SULLIVAN (2014).  Though the case concerned an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort 
claim, the First Amendment rule, that parody is protected, is analogous to the defamation context.  
See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52–53 (analogizing respondent’s emotional distress claim to a 
defamation claim, both of which require the “breathing space” provided by the First Amend-
ment). 
47. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57.  
48. See, e.g., id. at 48–49. 
49. David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 
CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 99–100 (1991).  
50. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (emphasis added).  
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defamatory meaning if the reasonable reader could mistake it for a truthful 
statement when viewed in its normal context.51 
Thus, to determine whether a statement that the author intended as 
parody is susceptible to defamatory meaning, courts must step into the 
shoes of the reasonable reader,52 interpret the statement in its ordinary con-
text,53 and determine whether the reader could rationally understand it as 
alleging actual facts.54  While such an inquiry may appear relatively 
straightforward, the analysis raises a number of difficult questions regard-
ing how readers understand meaning and construe statements, even for tra-
ditional media.  For example, who is the reasonable reader?  What does he 
or she understand as parody?  What is the appropriate context in which to 
view a statement?  The following two sections describe how courts have 
defined the reasonable reader and the relevant context of an allegedly de-
famatory statement in the realm of traditional media. 
A. The Reasonable Reader 
Because defamatory meaning hinges on a hypothetical reader’s un-
derstanding of the statement at issue,55 how courts define the reasonable 
reader’s interpretive abilities can influence the analysis.56  Courts consider 
both actual facts about reader habits, as well as First Amendment theories 
about the rationality of market actors, when determining the reasonable 
reader’s traits.57 
                                                          
51. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968, 972–73 (Md. 1982) (holding that a 
radio host’s statement that the host intended as parody, but that “certain . . . listeners [reasonably] 
did not recognize the ‘humor’ in the radio host’s words” could be the basis for defamation dam-
ages). 
52. McCraw, supra note 49, at 99. 
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
54. Id.  
55. Id.; see also McCraw, supra note 49, at 99–100 (describing how the court determines 
defamatory meaning). 
56. See McCraw, supra note 49, at 103 (describing different interpretations of the reason-
able reader in defamation law). 
57. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment 
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 808 (2010) (describing how the Supreme Court relied on actual 
reader reactions to a particular statement, as well as the principle that readers are inherently rea-
sonable, when construing the language at issue in Cohen v. California). 
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The reasonable reader is an objective, hypothetical figure whose in-
terpretation of a statement need not conform with actual peoples’ interpre-
tations.58  Instead, a statement’s meaning is a question of law, and the court 
may decide that the reasonable reader’s interpretation of a statement is dis-
tinct from the meaning “intended by the writer or actually received by 
readers.”59  Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot sustain a defamation claim by 
simply proving that the alleged statement would have “wound[ed] the feel-
ings” of a sensitive person.60  
Nonetheless, courts often rely on evidence about how readers actually 
intake information in their determination of how a reasonable reader would 
behave in certain circumstances.61  Facts and assumptions about reading 
habits, such as how readers may not read small print, are relevant to the de-
famatory meaning analysis.62  For instance, in Stanton v. Metro Corp., the 
First Circuit took into account how readers may not see a disclaimer when 
it is printed in small font between two other lines of large, bolded print, 
when interpreting whether a magazine article was defamatory.63  In Embrey 
v. Holly, the Maryland Court of Appeals relied on the fact that people had 
actually mistaken a statement on a radio show to be true when determining 
how the reasonable reader would understand the statement.64  In Embrey, 
the court found that the listener could reasonably take the radio host’s on-
air statement, that the plaintiff “[p]robably [hurt his knee while] carrying 
[a] TV during [a] blizzard [that occurred the week prior],” as alleging actu-
al facts.65  In Cohen v. California, the United States Supreme Court (“Su-
                                                          
58. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 (Ct. 
App. 1993); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:17 (2d ed. 2020) (describ-
ing how the reasonable reader is hypothetical, rather than the lowest common denominator). 
 59. See McCraw, supra note 49, at 100. 
60. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF THE INTERNET 243 (2001). 
61. See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 49, at 103–04 (arguing that the Milkovich majority and 
dissent’s different interpretations of the statement at issue have to do with different interpretations 
of how readers comprehend language). 
62. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2006).  
63. Id.  
64. Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968 (Md. 1982). 
65. Id. 
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preme Court”) also implicitly relied on how people actually reacted to par-
ticular language in its determination of defamatory meaning.66 
In addition to contemplating facts or assumptions about actual reader 
habits when interpreting the reasonable reader’s comprehension abilities, 
courts have also relied on First Amendment theories about the rationality of 
marketplace actors.67  Since the birth of the modern First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has conceived readers as inherently rational beings68 aware 
of widely-known political and cultural events and figures.69  In Cohen, for 
example, the Court concluded that a reasonable reader of the message on 
the appellant’s jacket, which stated “Fuck the Draft,” would understand 
that the jacket was not intended as a personal insult.70  Though the Court 
acknowledged that the same language used on the appellant’s jacket was 
often used for personal attacks,71 it favored an interpretation of the reason-
able reader that was attuned to context and nuance.72  The Court held that 
the reasonable reader would be aware of the national draft opposition con-
text and would understand the statement as political.73 
As a result, when interpreting the reasonable reader’s characteristics, 
courts look both to actual reader traits and to principles of rationality un-
                                                          
66. See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 49, at 103–04; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15, 20 (1971) (describing how nobody actually reacted violently to allegedly inciteful speech 
when interpreting whether the reasonable reader would react violently to the language). 
67. Lidsky, supra note 57, at 808. 
68. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing how no rational person would react violently to the pamphlets); McCraw, supra note 49, 
at 100–01. 
69. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 17 (implicitly assuming that reasonable readers of appel-
lant’s jacket would understand it as a reference to the national context of opposition to the draft). 
70. Id. at 20. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (“No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the 
words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult.”) (emphasis added). 
73. Id.; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988) (considering 
how the parodied individual was a nationally known minister when interpreting a statement).  
Although the Supreme Court did not interpret whether the statement was defamatory in Hustler, 
commentators have used the case when interpreting which context is relevant to the defamatory 
meaning analysis.  McCraw, supra note 49, at 100. 
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dergirding the First Amendment.74  However, those two factors can con-
flict, such as when an author reasonably expects that readers will under-
stand a statement as parody, but readers nonetheless mistake the statement 
to be true.75  In those circumstances, courts often interpret in favor of the 
First Amendment principles of rationality, invoking the objective, hypo-
thetical reader to reject the interpretation of actual readers.76  In New Times, 
Inc. v. Isaacks, for instance, the Texas Supreme Court found that an article 
in the Dallas Observer intended as parody, which had been reportedly mis-
understood by many readers to allege actual facts about the plaintiff, was 
not defamatory since the reasonable reader would understand the allegedly 
defamatory article as a joke.77  The author of the article intended to use 
parody to mock a local school which had recently taken extreme action to 
penalize a menial student transgression.78  In doing so, the author wrote a 
fake parody article entitled “Stop the Madness,” describing how the school 
handcuffed a “diminutive six-year old” for suspicion of making “terroristic 
threats.”79  While the parody article appeared under the heading, “News,” 
and thus confused several actual readers who took the statement as true,80 
the court reasoned that the absurdity of the claims in the article made clear 
to the reasonable reader that they were parody.81  While the article had a 
“superficial degree of plausibility,” the court noted that “such is the hall-
mark of satire.”82  
                                                          
74. McCraw, supra note 49, at 100; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
75. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 
465 (Ct. App. 1993) (describing how a plaintiff understood a newspaper article which the author 
intended as parody to allege actual facts). 
76. Id. at 467 (holding that “the April Fool’s section of the paper was obviously and un-
ambiguously a parody”). 
77. New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 161 (Tex. 2004); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:15 (2d ed. 2020). 
78. New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 148 (describing how a local school called police of-
ficers to retrieve a boy who had written a violent story from his class). 
79. Id. at 147–48. 
80. Id. at 159. 
81. Id. at 161; SMOLLA, supra note 77, § 4:15. 
82. New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 161. 
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B. The Relevant Context 
To determine whether a statement an author intended as parody is 
susceptible to defamatory meaning, courts must not only define the reason-
able reader’s characteristics and step into their shoes to interpret the state-
ment83 as described above.  Courts must also interpret the statement in its 
context to determine whether the reader could rationally understand the 
statement as alleging actual facts.84  The way in which courts define the 
context relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis is often determinative 
in defamation cases, particularly those involving parody.  This section de-
scribes how courts apply the Restatement Second of Torts (“Restatement”) 
approach to statements authors intended as parody in traditional media.  
1.  Divergent Approaches to Extrinsic Content 
The Restatement is contradictory on the matter of defining the context 
relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis, which has led to divergent 
approaches regarding content extrinsic to what readers ordinarily read or 
hear with an allegedly defamatory statement.85  The Restatement defines an 
allegedly defamatory statement’s relevant context as “all parts of the com-
munication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.”86  For instance, “the 
entire contents of a personal letter are considered as the context of any part 
of it because a recipient of the letter ordinarily reads the entire communica-
tion at one time.”87  Courts generally attempt to follow this approach.88  
These courts have required that allegedly defamatory statements contained 
in magazine or newspaper articles be read in the context of the article as a 
                                                          
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d. 
85. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for Communications Con-
taining Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 888–89 (2003) (de-
scribing the Restatement’s “facially contradictory language” and the different approaches courts 
have taken as a result). 
86.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d. 
87. Id. 
88. See, e.g., Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1993); Polygram 
Records. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 554 (Ct. App. 1985).  
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whole, declining to dissect articles line by line.89  A documentary film clip 
could not be analyzed alone, explained one court, but must be analyzed 
within the context of the film as a whole.90  
However, a mechanical application of the Restatement approach91 
seems to conflict with First Amendment principles in certain settings.92  
For example, courts are split on whether allegedly defamatory front-page 
headlines should be interpreted in the context of the internal article, which 
may qualify the defamatory imputation contained in the headline.93  The 
note to the defamation section of the Restatement takes the approach that 
the “text of a newspaper article is ordinarily not the context of the head-
line” when “circumstances” indicate that the public would not “ordinarily” 
read them together.94  Thus, the Restatement rule points to the conclusion 
that courts should read front-page headlines alone, without the context of 
the internal article.95  Unlike a headline that appears directly above the arti-
cle it describes, such that readers would “ordinarily” read both the headline 
and the article together,96 “circumstances” indicate that readers frequently 
                                                          
89. See Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (considering the 
statements in context of the article as a whole, including the article’s internal organization); see 
also Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 396 (8th Cir. 
1996) (“The question is not whether that article can be divided into two parts, and each of those 
parts so analyzed separately from each other that each would appear to be free from defamatory 
meaning. The article must be construed as a whole.”). 
90. Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat’l Found., 731 So.2d 702, 705–06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that the trial court erred in showing an allegedly defamatory statement from a documen-
tary film to the jury because a “publication must be considered in its totality”) (citing Byrd v. 
Hustler Magazine, 433 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).  
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d. 
92. Leonard M. Niehoff, Opinions, Implications, and Confusions, 28 COMMC’NS 
LAWYER 19, 21 (Nov. 2011) (describing how the Restatement approach would dictate a “form of 
a heckler’s veto” in the context of front-page headlines). 
93. See, e.g., King, supra note 85, at 878.  
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d. 
95. See id. (noting that the text of a newspaper article “may explain or qualify a defamato-
ry imputation conveyed when the headline alone is read”). 
96. Id.  
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only read the front-page headlines of publications without taking the time 
to flip to the internal article, or even to purchase the publication.97  
On the other hand, modern First Amendment law says that the rea-
sonable reader should be rational and attuned to contextual clues.98  This 
fact weighs in favor of determining that the hypothetical reasonable reader, 
as conceived by the Supreme Court, would take the time to flip to the inter-
nal article when reading a front-page headline, such that the headline and 
the internal article should be considered together.99  As one commentator 
noted, the “law . . . indulges in a fiction [to avoid] a form of heckler’s veto, 
where the predispositions and personalities of a less-than-ideal audience 
[that do not read articles] determine the rights of the speaker.”100 
Because of the First Amendment concerns, the majority approach is 
to read a potentially defamatory front-page headline in the context of the 
internal article as a whole when determining whether it is capable of sus-
taining a defamatory meaning.101  For example, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court found a front-page headline non-defamatory when read in the context 
of the internal article it referenced.102  The headline said, “‘[Plaintiff was] 
found in default on grain storage contract[,]’ . . . ‘Fraud trial opens . . . 
.’”103 Though the second clause of the headline alone reasonably implied 
                                                          
97. See, e.g., Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998) (de-
scribing how readers often skim magazine headlines on the grocery store checkout line). 
98. See supra Part II.A.  See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Lidsky, supra note 57, at 815 (describing how, while “Justice 
Holmes and Brandeis provided the building blocks . . . any number of First Amendment doctrines 
rely on a model of the audience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through masses of 
information to find truth”); for a modern example, see, e.g., Baker v. L.A. Herald Exam’r, 42 
Cal.3d 254, 262 (1986) (describing how a defamatory statement “is to be measured…by its . . . 
natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader” and what that reader “could 
have reasonably understood”). 
99. Additionally, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), the Supreme 
Court read a headline stating, “Maple beat the law with the ‘big lie,’” together with a column that 
accused the coach of lying and setting a bad example for children.  Determining that “[t]he clear 
impact’” of the headline and column “‘is that [the plaintiff] lied at the hearing after . . . having 
given his solemn oath to tell the truth,’” the Court held that the statement was defamatory. 
 100. Niehoff, supra note 92, at 21. 
101. Id. 
102. Blake v. Gannett Co., 529 So.2d 595, 605 (Miss. 1988). 
103. Id. 
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the plaintiff was on trial for fraud, the court reasoned that the internal arti-
cle clarified that an individual other than the plaintiff was actually on trial, 
such that the headline was not defamatory.104  
Only a minority of courts track the Restatement rule regarding front-
page headlines, considering the front-page headline separately from the in-
ternal article under certain “circumstances.”105  When determining whether 
the article and headline should be read together, these courts consider fac-
tors such as the accessibility of the internal article from the headline106 and 
whether the front cover points readers to the relevant internal content.107  
For example, one court held that the question of whether an article printed 
seventeen pages from an allegedly defamatory headline was relevant con-
text to consider belonged to the jury.108  By contrast, since there is so little 
content that readers “ordinarily”109 read when viewing an allegedly de-
famatory statement contained in a front-page headline, the majority ap-
proach “indulges in a fiction” to avoid chilling speech and reads the state-
ment in the context of the internal article.110  
2. Parody and Extrinsic Content 
The question of whether courts should consider content outside what 
readers “ordinarily”111 read arises in circumstances other than just newspa-
per headlines.  Cases involving parody, for instance, often raise extrinsic 
content questions.112  Parody authors rely on many contextual clues to 
                                                          
104. Id. 
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; King Jr., supra note 85, at 884. 
106. See Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998). 
107. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2006). 
108. Kaelin, 162 F.3d at 1041. 
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563, cmt. d.  
110. Niehoff, supra, note 92, at 21; see also King, Jr., supra, note 85, at 867 (proposing a 
rule for how to interpret allegedly defamatory headlines). 
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d. 
112. See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 49, at 94–95 (describing how “[t]he problem [with 
parody] is that statements of opinion, as well as parody and hyperbole, may be read to imply the 
existence of facts” absent contextual clues).  
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communicate their intended meaning to their readers.113  For instance, par-
ody authors often use disclaimers to describe that the relevant text was not 
intended to allege actual facts about the subject of the parody.114  Parody 
authors also frequently rely on hyperbolic rhetoric, imaginative expression, 
and many other situational cues to indicate to readers that a particular pub-
lication or statement is parody.115  One newspaper printed a parody section 
of the newspaper upside-down to signal the satirical nature of the section to 
readers, for instance.116  Additionally, because the Supreme Court has de-
scribed parody as core First Amendment speech,117 courts are often keen to 
protect the genre and consider content outside of what readers “ordinarily” 
might see.118 
As a result, courts often consider extrinsic content when determining 
whether a statement intended as parody is defamatory.119  In San Francisco 
Bay Guardian v. Superior Court, for instance, a landlord sued a newspaper 
for defamation, alleging that a statement in a parody letter-to-the-editor was 
defamatory.120  The letter stated, purportedly in the voice of the plaintiff, “I 
don’t understand why [a public figure] is so upset about electroshock ther-
                                                          
113. See, e.g., Amy Johnson, Decrowning Doubles: Indexicality and Aspect in a Bahraini 
Twitter Parody Account, 48 AL-’ARABIYYA 61, 65, 67 (2015) (describing how Twitter parody 
accounts rely on linguistic, social, and political clues to create meaning). 
114. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) (describing how 
the meaning of a parody statement was informed by a disclaimer in the bottom right corner of the 
advertisement in which the allegedly defamatory statement appeared).  
 115. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Assn. Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (inter-
preting a parody statement in light of its imaginative expression). 
116. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 466 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
117. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 54 (“Satirical cartoons have played a prom-
inent role in public and political debate.”). 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; cf. San Francisco Bay Guardian, 
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466 (considering an allegedly defamatory parody article in the context of a 
parody disclaimer in the front of the newspaper, which readers might not have seen when reading 
the article). 
119. See, e.g., New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 159 (Tex. 2004) (considering 
whether a newspaper had printed parody articles in past issues when determining whether a paro-
dy article in the current issue was defamatory). 
120. San Francisco Bay Guardian, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465. 
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apy. I find that my tenants who have undergone this treatment are much 
more cooperative.”121 The court reasoned that the statement could plausibly 
be mistaken as true in the context of the letter alone, as the statement ap-
peared in the same type-face as the normal paper and contained a subtle 
brand of parody.122 
Nonetheless, the San Francisco Bay Guardian court held that the 
statement could not reasonably be understood as defamatory.123  Notably, 
most of the court’s reasoning drew from extrinsic content that an actual 
reader may not have “ordinarily” seen in one sitting under the Restatement 
approach.124  Relying on earlier articles in the parody section of the paper 
that were more obvious parody, “recognizable as jokes at first glance,”125 
the court concluded that the reasonable reader would have taken the come-
dic nature of the adjacent articles into account when interpreting the alleg-
edly defamatory statement in the parody letter-to-the-editor.126  In light of 
the additional articles, the court held the statement in the parody letter-to-
the-editor was not defamatory since it could not be understood as alleging 
actual facts about the plaintiff.127 
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DEFAMATORY MEANING AND PARODY 
IN TWEETS 
While the defamatory meaning analysis already raises difficult ques-
tions in traditional media,128 courts today also address additional questions 
regarding how the characteristics of Twitter129 and Twitter parody ac-
                                                          
121. Id. at 464–65. 
122. Id. at 466 (describing how “[o]n the page containing the letters to the editor, some of 
the material is not [as] obvious” as parody material on other pages). 
123. Id. at 467. 
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. c.  
125. San Francisco Bay Guardian, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466. 
126. Id. (describing how some of the jokes in the newspaper’s other sections were “rec-
ognizable as jokes at first glance,” compared to the more subtle parody statement at issue there). 
127. Id. 
128. See discussion supra Part II. 
129. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 343 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (analyzing an 
allegedly defamatory tweet); Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) 
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counts130 affect the analysis.  The following section summarizes divergent 
approaches courts have taken when interpreting what the reasonable reader 
of a tweet understands as parody, as well as what content extrinsic to the 
tweet, if any, is relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis.  Because 
there have been so few cases specifically involving Twitter parody,131 this 
section also incorporates relevant analysis from courts considering Twitter 
defamation not concerning parody,132 and other social media website paro-
dy defamation cases.133 
A. Divergent Approaches to the “Reasonable Reader” of Tweets 
Courts have contemplated whether the hypothetical reader of an al-
legedly defamatory tweet is as competent at interpreting contextual clues as 
the hypothetical reader of traditional media,134 or whether readers on Twit-
ter almost always understand all tweets on the website to be too “loose” 
and “hyperbolic” to allege actual facts.135 
The question arises from research demonstrating actual problems with 
disinformation on Twitter.136  Courts have diverged on the question of 
whether evidence about how readers often struggle to discern truth from 
falsity online should change how courts think about the hypothetical rea-
sonable reader of online speech.  In traditional media, courts have favored 
                                                          
130. See, e.g., Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3–4 (Mich. Ct. App. 
May 19, 2016) (analyzing an allegedly defamatory tweet from a parody account). 
 131. See, e.g., id. at *1.  Several Twitter parody defamation cases are currently pending.  
See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-1715, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 (Va. Cir. June 24, 2020). 
132. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342 (analyzing an allegedly defamatory tweet that was not 
intended as parody). 
133. O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F. Supp. 3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (analyzing an alleged-
ly defamatory Disqus post intended as parody). 
134. See Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343 (considering how “[t]he informal nature of conver-
sation on Twitter tends to encourage people to talk more freely about others, including the spread-
ing of rumors and potential falsehoods.”). 
135. Id. at 342. 
136. See, e.g., id. at 343 (analyzing an allegedly defamatory tweet in light of the “general 
lack of coherence” of online speech); see also Shelly Banjo, Facebook, Twitter and the Digital 
Disinformation Mess, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019, 12:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/facebook-twitter-and-the-digital-disinformation-mess/2019/10/01/53334c08-e4b4-11e9-
b0a6-3d03721b85ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/E8F9-6QCK]. 
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an interpretation of readers as rational and attuned to social137 and cultural 
context,138 even when the real audience is “less-than-ideal” at interpreting 
nuances.139  Otherwise, courts and commentators have reasoned, the actual 
habits of the “less-than-ideal audience determine the rights of the speak-
er.”140 
However, some courts have reasoned that the reasonable reader 
standard should be different for online readers from the reasonable reader 
standard in traditional media.141  These courts reason that the hypothetical 
reasonable reader of tweets should be considered less willing and able to 
interpret contextual clues due to evidence of actual reader problems distin-
guishing truth from falsity online.142  Jacobus v. Trump exemplifies this 
line of thinking.143  The case arose when a political strategist, Cheryl Jaco-
bus, rejected a position from Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and 
then made critical comments about then-candidate Trump on cable news.144  
Following Jacobus’s comments on television, Trump tweeted 
“@cherijacobus begged us for a job. We said no and she went hostile . . . 
.”145 
                                                          
 137. See supra Part II.A.; see also New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex. 
2004) (holding that an article was nondefamatory despite the fact that the article was labeled 
“News” and some readers misunderstood it as alleging actual facts). 
138. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988) (implicitly reason-
ing that the reasonable readers of a parody statement knew that the parody subject was a minister, 
since this information was “nationally known”).  
139. Niehoff, supra note 92, at 21.  
140. Id.; see also Nelson v. Superior Court, No. B283743, 2018 WL 1061575, at *5 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018), as modified on denial of reh’g, Mar. 27, 2018 (unpublished) (interpret-
ing an allegedly defamatory parody YouTube video) (“While courts have recognized that online 
posters often ‘play fast and loose with facts,’ this should not be taken to mean online commenta-
tors are immune from defamation liability.”). 
141. See, e.g., Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343. 
142. Id. (reasoning that readers simply presume statements are false or opinion amid the 
“general lack of coherence” on the internet and Twitter specifically); see also RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6:70.50 (2d ed. 2020) (criticizing the Jacobus court’s ap-
proach).  
143. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339. 
 144. Id. at 334. 
145. Id. 
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Jacobus sued Trump in New York state court for defamation, arguing 
that the tweet implied provably false facts.146  The court found that the 
statements were not defamatory since no reasonable reader would interpret 
the statements as true in the context of Twitter and Trump’s account.147  
The court characterized speech online and on Twitter specifically as gener-
ally rife with “slang, grammatical mistakes, spelling errors . . . .”148  As a 
result, the court reasoned that the readers of tweets, lost in what the court 
called the “lack of coherence” of online speech,149 almost always under-
stand tweets as statements of “vigorous expressions of personal opin-
ion.”150  Thus, Trump’s tweet that Jacobus “‘begged’” for a job, the court 
explained, “is reasonably viewed as a loose, figurative, and hyperbolic ref-
erence to [the] plaintiff’s state of mind” and is “not susceptible of objective 
verification.”151 
By contrast, the Levitt court,152 for example, did not begin the analysis 
with a presumption that all tweets are too vague and simplistic to be de-
famatory.  Instead, the court likened reasonable Twitter readers to readers 
of traditional media153 who “evaluat[e] allegedly defamatory statements . . . 
in context . . . .”154  Then, the Levitt court looked to the tweet’s context to 
                                                          
146. Id. at 335; see also SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50 (describing how Jacobus ar-
gued that she could prove that the Trump campaign had in fact approached her for a job, not the 
other way around, as the tweet implied). 
147. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343. 
148. Id. (quoting Technovate v. Fanelli, No. 003713 WL 5554547, at *4 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
Sep. 10, 2015)). 
149. Id.; cf. Katy Waldman, Is the Internet Making Writing Better?, NEW YORKER (July 
26, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-the-internet-making-writing-
better?verso=true [https://perma.cc/UC8E-X6LZ] (describing a book that argues that “new rules 
of English” have displaced old rules of language, implying that readers are able to comprehend 
speech on the internet). 
150. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339 (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1995)). 
151. Id. at 342. 
 152. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 
2016). 
153. Id. (defining the reasonable reader by analogizing from traditional media cases).  
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determine whether the tweet was parody, rather than assuming that the 
speech is false or opinion simply because it appears on Twitter.155 
B. Defining the Relevant Context of a Tweet 
Courts have also taken different approaches to defining the context of 
an allegedly defamatory tweet.156  In particular, the lack of context sur-
rounding tweets157 and the interactive nature of Twitter158 has raised diffi-
cult questions regarding the relevance of content extrinsic to the tweet as it 
appears on the timeline.159  
                                                          
154. Id. at *4; cf. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S. 3d at 342.  See also SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 
6:70.50 (arguing that the Jacobus court’s reasoning was incorrect; “[t]hat some actors in society 
may be losing a grip on truth . . . does not mean that courts of law should [because] defamation 
law assumes juries are competent to distinguish true facts from false ones”). 
155. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *4; cf. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S. 3d at 342 (reasoning that 
because “truth itself has been lost in the cacophony of online and Twitter verbiage . . . [the state-
ment] is reasonably viewed as a loose, figurative, and hyperbolic reference to a plaintiff’s state of 
mind).  See also SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50. 
156. Compare Winter v. Pinkins, No. 14–cv–8817, 2017 WL 5496278, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 17, 2017) (considering only the text of the tweet alone) with Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 
(considering the plaintiff’s profession as an attorney and a professor when determining that such a 
person would not say such inappropriate things as those said by the parody account). 
157. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that, because of the character limitation on 
Twitter, tweets should be considered in the context of information beyond just the timeline).  
Note that, at the time of Hunt’s article, tweets were limited to a maximum of 140 characters, but 
now may be as long as 280 characters, though that does not weigh heavily in the analysis.  See 
Sarah Perez, Twitter’s Doubling of Character Count From 140 to 280 Had Little Impact on 
Length of Tweets, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:51 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/30
/twitters-doubling-of-character-count-from-140-to-280-had-little-impact-on-length-of-tweets/ 
[https://perma.cc/J7DR-2REY]. 
 158. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable Readers and 
Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 155, 165 
(2016) (discussing how the interactive nature of hashtags applies to the defamation analysis on 
Twitter). 
159. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (proposing that courts read tweets in light of 
the account’s contemporaneously posted tweets when determining whether the tweet is defamato-
ry).  On Twitter, “Home timelines display a stream of Tweets from Twitter accounts that have 
been followed or selected by the account creator.”  Johnson, supra note 113, at 65, 81 n.12 (de-
scribing how Twitter parody accounts rely on linguistic, social, and political clues to create mean-
ing). 
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Some courts consider only the language of the tweet itself.160  Other 
courts consider only the content immediately surrounding the tweet, as it 
appears on the timeline, when determining whether the tweet is defamato-
ry.161  For example, the Levitt court considered the defendant’s Twitter ac-
count name, which appears above the tweet on the timeline,162 when deter-
mining whether the parody account was defamatory.163  In the context of 
another social media website, Disqus, which is “very similar to Twitter,” in 
how disparate user posts also appear on a home timeline,164 a court found 
that the account name “Knotty is a Tramp” above the post indicated the 
post was parody.165  In O’Donnell v. Knott, the statement was nondefama-
tory because, the court reasoned, “a reasonable reader would not believe 
that Kathryn Knott [the plaintiff] actually created this profile [to] comment 
on articles about herself.”166  The court reasoned that the account’s unflat-
tering profile picture, featuring the subject of the parody drinking a bottle 
of alcohol, also indicated that the account was parody.167 
Finally, some courts take a broad view of extrinsic content in Twitter 
defamation, considering content beyond just the Twitter timeline.168  While 
the name, handle, and profile picture of the tweeting account are available 
                                                          
160. See, e.g., Winter, 2017 WL 5496278, at *2 (considering only the language of the 
tweet itself); AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 509 (W.D. Va. 2013). 
161. See, e.g., Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 (reading an allegedly defamatory tweet in 
the context of the name of the tweeting account). 
162. Id.; see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 62 (showing an image of a tweet on the 
timeline with the account name above the text of the tweet). 
163. See also O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F. Supp. 3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that 
a post was non-defamatory parody when the account that made the post was called “Knotty the 
Tramp”).  The O’Donnell case is not from Twitter, but rather from Disqus, a social media website 
that is similar to Twitter.  
164. Id. at 292. 
165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 301. 
167. Id. 
168. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 344 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (considering ad-
ditional tweets from the defendant’s account, which a Twitter user only could have seen by navi-
gating to the user’s account from the timeline and scrolling through hundreds of tweets from the 
account, when determining whether a different tweet from the account was defamatory). 
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immediately surrounding the tweet on the home timeline,169 there is addi-
tional information that may furnish tweets with context.  Other tweets from 
the same account that posted the allegedly defamatory tweet can be rele-
vant, some courts have held.170  This is akin to considering an internal arti-
cle when interpreting the meaning of a front-page headline because addi-
tional tweets from the same account are not available on the timeline with 
the statement at issue; the additional tweets instead appear a click and a 
scroll away.171  For example, the Jacobus court read the defendant’s alleg-
edly defamatory tweet that the plaintiff “begged” for a job in light of the 
general tone of the defendant’s tweets, which were “rife with vague and 
simplistic insults.”172  Those tweets were weighed heavily by the court, 
though the reader would not necessarily have seen them without clicking 
and scrolling.173  The court reasoned that this fact made it less likely that 
the reasonable reader would take the tweet at issue as alleging actual facts 
about a person.174  In another case, Feld v. Conway, the court similarly con-
sidered content external to the Twitter timeline to be relevant to a tweet’s 
meaning.175 There, the court reasoned that the tweet should be construed 
within the context of a contemporaneous “heated internet debate” that pre-
ceded the post.176  As a result, the casual and interactive nature of Twitter 
has complicated the defamatory meaning analysis even further.  Part IV 
                                                          
169. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 62 (showing the image of a tweet on a Twitter time-
line). 
170. See, e.g., Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 344 (reading an allegedly defamatory tweet in 
context of the general tone of defendant’s account); Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 
2944824, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2016) (reading an allegedly defamatory tweet in the con-
text of disclaimer tweets that the same account had previously posted). 
171. Johnson, supra note 113, at 77–78 (describing the various ways in which users can 
interact with content on Twitter). 
172. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342. 
173. Johnson, supra note 113, at 77 (distinguishing between the profile information on 
Twitter, available on the timeline, and the additional “exchanges . . . visible via the profile page . . 
. [that] displays the [t]weets from that participant”). 
174. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S. 3d at 343. 
175. Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (describing how “the tweet was 
made as part of a heated Internet debate about plaintiff’s responsibility for the disappearance of 
[a] horse.”). 
176. Id.  
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proposes a methodology for interpreting how the reasonable reader would 
understand parody tweets. 
IV. METHOD TO DETERMINE WHETHER PARODY TWEETS ARE 
DEFAMATORY 
At 280 characters or less,177 tweets are extremely short, so they raise 
similar questions as front-page headlines regarding whether extrinsic con-
tent is relevant to interpreting a statement.178  Additionally, parody ac-
counts are ubiquitous on Twitter,179 providing additional reasons to consid-
er how readers interpret contextual clues on such platform.180  Twitter is 
unique among social media websites in that it actually explicitly permits 
users to create parody accounts and has detailed policies regarding how 
parody accounts must signal their satirical nature to Twitter users.181  As a 
result, parody accounts have become extremely common and notable as-
pects of Twitter.182  Because parody authors often require context to com-
municate meaning,183 there are many reasons for courts to characterize 
Twitter users as rational and adept at interpreting extrinsic content in order 
to preserve the viability of parody Twitter accounts, which often produce 
important social commentary.184 
                                                          
177. See Perez, supra note 157. 
178. Lidsky & Jones, supra note 158, at 161. 
179. See Ashley Parker, Fake Twitter Accounts Get Real Laughs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/politics/10fake-twitter.html [https://perma.cc
/9H7M-4DE7]. 
180. Johnson, supra note 113, at 65, 67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on 
linguistic, social, and political clues to create meaning). 
181. Johnson, supra note 113, at 65 (explaining that Twitter is “[u]nusual among social 
media and tech companies, [because it] has long supported parody through official policy”); Par-
ody, Newsfeed, Commentary, and Fan Account Policy (The “Policy”), TWITTER, https://
help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy [https://perma.cc/BK4T-UDLE]. 
182. See Parker, supra note 179.  
183. Johnson, supra note 113, at 65, 67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on 
linguistic, social, and political context). 
184. See, e.g., @DennisPBlock, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/dennispblock?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/9NFR-X42M] (using parody to critique the harsh practices of a well-known Los 
Angeles eviction attorney).  See also, Jessica Garrison, He Shows Renters the Door, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar, 14, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-14-me-
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Additionally, like other social media websites, Twitter is interac-
tive,185 which raises additional questions about the context analysis.  Unlike 
a static print publication, Twitter allows users to “click[]” and “open” 
tweets to “expand its conversations” and see other users’ replies to the 
tweet.186  Users can also click away from the Twitter timeline, where 
“[t]weets are usually encountered in streams of [other tweets],” to another 
user’s profile page.187  The Restatement approach to context, however, de-
scribes stable print publications, like newspapers and letters.188  The Re-
statement is able to generalize from what readers “ordinarily” see when 
reading a letter, namely the text of the letter from beginning to end.189  But 
what do readers actually see when reading tweets?190  Should courts find 
the hypothetical reader of a tweet to have simply read the tweet as it ap-
pears on the timeline, or to have clicked on the tweet to see extrinsic con-
tent?  Developing a methodology for interpreting the reasonable reader of 
tweets and how they interact with contextual clues on Twitter, first and 
foremost, is helpful to clarify the path forward for courts as they increas-
ingly see more cases involving tweets intended as parody. 
However, giving courts a clear sense of how rational users interact 
with Twitter and parody accounts is extremely important in other contexts 
as well.  Several state legislatures have passed laws criminalizing online 
impersonation to cause harm, aimed at punishing actions like cyberbullying 
and catfishing.191  For example, California has a statute prohibiting “know-
                                                          
evictlawyer14-story.html [https://perma.cc/MBA6-GDV4] (explaining that the attorney “de-
scribes himself [as] ‘[a] man who evicted more tenants than any other human being on the planet 
Earth.’”). 
185. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 579–80 (describing the various actions that users on 
Twitter can take, such as retweeting, commenting, and replying on tweets). 
186. Johnson, supra note 113, at 77–78.  
187. Id. at 67. 
 188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d (using both newspaper headlines 
and letters to describe the proper approach to context). 
189. Id.  
190. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67, 77–78 (describing how “[o]n Twitter, users in-
teract with tweets in a variety of ways, including scrolling past them on the timeline and clicking 
on the tweet to read replies.”). 
191. McSherry, supra note 30. 
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ingly and without consent credibly impersonat[ing] [a person online] . . . 
for purposes of harming” them.192  But commentators have noted that this 
law, and other similar ones, threaten to sweep up Twitter parody authors in 
their enforcement.193  Since Twitter parody accounts often purport to speak 
in the voice of the parody’s subject,194 they may be accused of impersona-
tion.195  This is especially problematic as Twitter parody cases often impli-
cate core First Amendment speech on issues in the public interest.196  
Thus, it is particularly important to clarify how the reasonable Twitter 
user interprets meaning on the platform, not only in the defamation context, 
but also in the context of e-personation statutes.  This section first argues 
that courts should interpret reasonable Twitter users as discerning, like the 
reasonable reader in traditional media.197  Then, this section analogizes 
from the contextual analysis in traditional media to propose the context in 
which to analyze the meaning of an allegedly defamatory parody tweet. 
A. Characterize Hypothetical Readers on Twitter as Rational and 
Discerning 
When hypothesizing the traits of the reasonable Twitter reader, courts 
should not characterize the hypothetical Twitter reader as less rational and 
discerning than the hypothetical reader of traditional media,198  as the 
Jacobus court did.  Because it is often more difficult to discern truth from 
                                                          
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a) (West 2020). 
193. McSherry, supra note 30. 
194. Johnson, supra note 113, at 68 (“Parody constitutes, reproduces, and alters an origi-
nal.”). 
195. McSherry, supra note 30.  Additionally, because parodies are often critical of the 
parodied individual, commentators fear that the intent element will be satisfied. 
196. See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-1715, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 (Va. Cir. 
June 24, 2020) (illustrating a case against a Twitter parody account that criticizes a U.S. Con-
gressmen for his political actions); Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 37, at *8 (describing a 
defamation lawsuit against a Twitter parody account that criticized a well-known Los Angeles 
eviction attorney for causing harm in the community). 
197. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
198. Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 337 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (describing the reasonable 
reader). 
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falsity online than in traditional media,199 and on Twitter specifically, some 
courts have reasoned that hypothetical Twitter readers should not be 
deemed as adept at navigating context as their traditional-media-reader 
counterparts.200  This approach is rooted in the rule from traditional media 
that courts sometimes look to actual factors to interpret the reasonable 
reader and how they would understand an allegedly defamatory tweet.201  
In particular, the Jacobus court’s citation to the “incoherence” of internet 
speech202 seems to arise implicitly from social commentaries noting the 
problems with disinformation online and on Twitter specifically, and the 
inability of many readers to determine fact from fiction on Twitter.203  
However, while real circumstances of reader behavior can inform the 
hypothetical reader’s traits, they are not necessarily dispositive.204  Thus, 
the fact that there actually is disinformation online that sometimes confuses 
Twitter readers205 does not necessarily mean that the hypothetical Twitter 
reader is unable to navigate context on Twitter as a general rule.206  In fact, 
in traditional media, courts have typically favored an interpretation of the 
reader as rational and able to decode context,207 even when actual readers 
                                                          
199. Id. at 339 (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1995)). 
 200. See, e.g., id. 
201. See discussion supra Part II.A.  See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (considering how some listeners mistook a radio host’s statement as true 
when determining whether it was defamatory). 
202. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339. 
203. Banjo, supra note 136. 
204. See, e.g., New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 144–45 (Tex. 2004) (holding 
that a newspaper was parody despite the fact that some readers mistook it as true).  
205. Banjo, supra note 136. 
 206. See SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50; see also Nelson v. Superior Court, No. 
B283743, 2018 WL 1061575, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018) as modified on denial of reh’g, 
Mar. 27, 2018 (unpublished) (interpreting an allegedly defamatory parody YouTube video).  
“While courts have recognized that online posters often ‘play fast and loose with facts,’ this 
should not be taken to mean online commentators are immune from defamation liability.” 
207. See, e.g., New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 158–59; see also Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (characterizing the hypothetical reader as rational and able to understand polit-
ical context). 
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in particular circumstances have proven to be less adept at interpreting an 
author’s intended meaning.208  In New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, for instance, 
though some readers of a fake parody newspaper article mistook the state-
ment as true,209 the court found that the reasonable reader would under-
stand the article as parody.210  There, the context of the “then-existing [pub-
lic] controversy” regarding the school board’s punishment of a student 
indicated to the reasonable reader that the traditional media statement did 
not allege actual facts.211  The Levitt court correctly tracked this reasoning 
in the Twitter realm,212 determining what the reasonable reader would un-
derstand from the context rather than presuming that the parody tweet was 
too “vague and simplistic”213 to be defamatory simply because it appeared 
on Twitter.  Thus, courts should still find that Twitter readers are adept at 
interpreting context,214 as problems with disinformation online are not dis-
positive in the reasonable reader analysis.  
                                                          
208. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 
467 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding a newspaper article nondefamatory parody despite the fact that the 
plaintiff mistook the article as true).  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pack-
ingham v. North Carolina implicitly lends support to the view that courts should find the hypo-
thetical reader of tweets to be as attuned to contextual clues as the hypothetical reader in tradi-
tional contexts.  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (referring to social 
media as the new “democratic forum,” which implies that the same theories about the need for 
rational actors in the marketplace of ideas should also apply on social media). 
209. The confusion resulted from the fact that the parody article was featured in the 
“News” section of the paper.  New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 159.  
210. Id. at 161. 
211. Id.; see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (implicitly assuming that reasonable readers of 
appellant’s jacket would understand it as a reference to the national context of opposition to the 
draft). 
212. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 
2016) (considering a statement in its relevant context to determine its meaning); see also 
SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50 (criticizing the Jacobus court’s approach to presuming the 
nondefamatory nature of tweets rather than examining them in context as a reasonable reader 
would). 
213. Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 342 (Sup. Ct. 2017).  
214. SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50 (describing how the reasonable reader is hypo-
thetical, rather than the lowest common denominator). 
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B. Read Tweets in Context 
In addition to characterizing Twitter readers as able and willing to in-
terpret contextual clues,215 courts should analogize from the Restatement 
approach216 to determine which context is relevant when interpreting a 
tweet.  Under that approach, courts should consider the information con-
tained in the tweet as it appears on the Twitter timeline, including the 
tweeting account’s name, handle, and profile picture.  Additionally, courts 
should consider content extrinsic to the Twitter timeline, including the 
tweeting account’s bio and other tweets in the same thread, in order to pro-
tect the First Amendment rights of Twitter parody authors. 
1. Relevant Content on the Timeline 
When considering whether a tweet intended as parody has defamatory 
meaning, courts should first look to the tweet as it appears on the timeline.  
This immediate context includes the name, handle, and profile picture of 
the account that posted the tweet.  Twitter users interact with content in a 
variety of ways,217 but the primary place where they encounter tweets is 
through the timeline, a homepage containing a stream of tweets from vari-
ous accounts,218 including accounts that the user follows and accounts that 
Twitter has promoted.219  From the timeline, users can take different ac-
tions.  For example, they can click on links contained within tweets in the 
timeline stream, thus navigating to external websites.220  Additionally, by 
clicking on a tweet, users can navigate from the timeline to the account that 
                                                          
215. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 65–67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts 
communicate meaning to readers through the use of linguistic, social, and political context). 
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563.   
217. Hunt, supra note 28, at 579–80 (describing the various actions that users on Twitter 
can take, such as retweeting, commenting, and replying on tweets). 
218. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67.  Accounts on the feed include accounts that the 
user follows, as well as accounts that Twitter promotes on the user’s feed.  About Your Twitter 
Timeline, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-timeline [https://perma.cc
/FG97-7KKJ]. 
219. Hunt, supra note 28, at 587. 
220. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 66 (discussing a parody author’s use of hyper-
links on their account to direct readers to different webpages); see also Lidsky & Jones, supra 
note 158, at 164-65 (describing the role of hyperlinks on social media). 
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posted the tweet, in order to see more content regarding the account’s past 
tweets.221  
Despite the interactive nature of Twitter and the many ways in which 
users can interact with the platform, courts can still analogize from the Re-
statement’s approach to defining relevant context.222  Recall that the Re-
statement defines an allegedly defamatory statement’s relevant context as 
“all parts of the communication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.”223  
For example, the relevant context to interpret an allegedly defamatory 
statement contained within a letter is “the entire contents of a personal let-
ter” since readers “ordinarily” read the whole letter at once.224  
Though Twitter is less stable than a letter, and different reasonable 
users may interact with the same tweet in different ways,225 courts should 
look to the tweet as it appears on the timeline when determining whether a 
reader would view the statement as defamatory.  The timeline is where us-
ers interact with most tweets, and thus it is the most stable medium in 
which to view a tweet as the reader “ordinarily” sees it.226  On the timeline, 
the tweet contains several identifying features of the account that posted the 
tweet.227  Directly above the text of the tweet itself, the tweet includes the 
name of the account that posted the tweet in white print,228 as well as the 
                                                          
221. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 77 (showing the image of a Twitter parody pro-
file picture). 
222. See generally, Johnson, supra note 113; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 
cmt. d. 
223. Id.  
224. Id. 
225. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (describing how communication on Twitter 
emerges from “the interaction of platform structure, interface design, and numerous account crea-
tors”). 
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; see also Johnson, supra note 113, 
at 67 (discussing how “[t]weets are not usually encountered in isolation,” but on the timeline).  
 227. Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (showing an image of a series of tweets on the Twit-
ter timeline, each with identifying features such as a name and profile picture). 
228. Id. 
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account’s handle in gray print,229 and a small, thumbnail version of the ac-
count’s profile picture.230  
This identifying information should be relevant when interpreting 
whether reasonable readers would understand a tweet as nondefamatory 
parody.  Just as courts have found that allegedly defamatory statements 
contained in an article cannot be parsed line by line but must be interpreted 
within the meaning of the article as a whole,231 courts should also not read 
tweets outside the context of at least the tweeting account’s name, handle, 
and profile picture, which readers “ordinarily read[] . . . at [the same] time” 
as the tweet itself.232 
Notably, for some parody accounts, this information on the timeline 
alone may be sufficient to demonstrate to readers that the tweet does not 
allege actual facts about the parodied individual and thus cannot be de-
famatory.  For example, in Levitt, one allegedly defamatory tweet stated, 
“Buying me a drink at Cabin Karaoke will get you extra [credit] . . . .”233  
The text alone is slightly odd and may signal to readers that the statement is 
parody,234 but considered in the context of the Levitt 2.0 account’s name, 
handle, and profile picture, reasonable readers235 would almost certainly 
understand the statement as parody.  The name of the account, “Levitt 
2.0,”236 like the Disqus account, “Knotty the Tramp,”237 had a name slight-
                                                          
229. Id.; see Walker, supra note 3. 
230. Johnson, supra note 113, at 67; see also id. at 77 (showing the full-size image of a 
Twitter parody profile picture, beyond the timeline). 
231. See Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (considering the 
statements in context of the article as a whole). 
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.   
233. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 
2016). 
234. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 
466 (Ct. App. 1993) (describing the parody statement, “I find that my tenants who have under-
gone [electroshock therapy] are much more cooperative” as subtle parody, since it is slightly on 
its face but does not include rhetorical language or obvious parody). 
235. Id. 
236. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3. 
237. See Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 343 (Sup. Ct. 2017); Feld v. Conway, 16 F. 
Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014); O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F.Supp.3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) 
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ly altering the parody subject’s name, indicating that the account and its 
tweets may be jokes.238  And though the Levitt court did not consider the 
account’s profile picture or handle,239 the Levitt 2.0 handle, 
“@levittlawyer,”240 weighs against a finding of parody, since the statement 
on its face does not appear odd or indicate a joke.241  But the account’s pro-
file picture, a kitschy posed photograph of a man in a fedora,242 would indi-
cate to the reasonable reader that the tweet is parody.243 
Thus, courts should consider the name, handle, and profile picture of 
an account when interpreting whether reasonable readers would understand 
a tweet as defamatory, since readers would ordinarily see that context when 
reading the tweet on the timeline. 
2. Relevant Content Beyond the Timeline 
In addition to interpreting tweets in the context of the identifying fea-
tures that appear on the timeline, courts should also look to several aspects 
of the account that tweeted the allegedly defamatory tweet, beyond content 
that appears directly on the Twitter timeline.  In particular, the following 
section argues that courts should look to the tweeting account’s bio244 and 
                                                          
(finding that a post was non-defamatory parody when the account that made the Disqus post was 
called “Knotty the Tramp”).  
238. O’Donnell, 283 F.Supp.3d at 301. 
239. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *4 (considering only the name of the account, the lan-
guage of the tweet, and similarities to the parodied account when interpreting the allegedly de-
famatory tweet). 
240. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.   
241. Cf. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 
(Ct. App. 1993) (describing how the parody letter-to-the-editor’s language was sufficiently odd to 
make the reasonable reader notice it might not be intended as factual). 
242. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.   
243. See, e.g., O’Donnell, 283 F.Supp.3d at 292 (finding a post from a Disqus account 
nondefamatory when its profile picture featured an unflattering image of the subject of the parody 
account drinking from a bottle of alcohol); see also Johnson, supra note 113, at 75 (depicting the 
profile picture of a parody Twitter account, featuring a Bahraini political figure’s smiling face 
with sunglasses on and a slightly theatrical pose). 
 244. Walker, supra note 3 (describing what a Twitter bio is). 
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other tweets in the same thread245 when determining whether the account is 
defamatory. 
As described above, tweets appear on the timeline with relatively lit-
tle context, when compared to traditional media.246  A maximum of 280 
characters,247 in addition to several identifying features of the relevant ac-
count, are all that readers “ordinarily” view on the timeline.248  By compar-
ison, courts have found that readers in traditional media “ordinarily” see 
information within the context of an entire newspaper article.249 
This lack of context makes Twitter parody authors particularly vul-
nerable to defamation liability.  Parodies often rely on all sorts of contextu-
al information, including cultural and political information, to create mean-
ing.250  But because tweets are so short,251 parody authors must squeeze the 
relevant contextual information into a very short tweet in order to escape 
liability.252  
In similar contexts in which readers may actually read statements with 
very little context, the majority of courts have nonetheless held that First 
Amendment principles required greater context.253  For example, though 
many newspaper readers often skim only headlines, the majority of courts 
                                                          
245. How to Create A Thread on Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/create-a-thread [https://perma.cc/24CQ-BHR9] (“A thread on Twitter is a series of con-
nected Tweets from one person.”). 
246. Id.   
247. Perez, supra note 157.  
248. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (explaining the content that Twitter users see on 
the timeline). 
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; see, e.g., New Times, Inc. v. 
Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Tex. 2004) (reading an allegedly defamatory statement contained 
in a newspaper article within the whole article). 
 250. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on 
complex contextual clues).  
251. Perez, supra note 157 (noting that tweets are limited to a maximum of 280 characters 
but are often shorter than that). 
252. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that courts should consider content extrinsic 
to the tweet when analyzing whether it is defamatory since tweets are so short). 
253. King, Jr., supra note 85, at 884. 
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depart from the Restatement approach for allegedly defamatory headlines 
and include the article in the context analysis.254  Free speech advocates 
support this approach as less burdensome on speech.255  
It would be appropriate to apply this front-page headline majority ap-
proach to tweets,256 which, like headlines, are brief and exist in very little 
context on the Twitter timeline, with “streams of [other] [t]weets.”257  As a 
result, courts should look beyond just the relevant content on the timeline 
when analyzing tweets intended as parody.  Namely, context of the tweet-
ing account’s bio, as well as any contemporaneous tweets included in the 
same thread as the allegedly defamatory tweet.  
First, the context for interpreting a tweet’s defamatory meaning 
should include the Twitter bio.  The Twitter official parody policy requires 
Twitter parody accounts to indicate their parodic nature in the bio, such as 
by writing: “This is a parody.”258  Additionally, unlike some other sources 
of extrinsic information,259 the bio is easily accessible from the timeline.260  
Users can see the bio by hovering the mouse over the tweet on the timeline 
or clicking on the tweet itself to navigate to the account page, meaning that 
even under the minority approach to headlines, courts may find that the bio 
is relevant.261  Thus, given the need for extrinsic content to interpret parody 
                                                          
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 908. 
256. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 562; King, Jr., supra note 85, at 908 (describing how the 
majority approach to headline can and should be applied to the internet). 
257. Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (describing the Twitter timeline). 
 258. Parody, Newsfeed, Commentary, and Fan Account Policy, supra note 181; see, e.g., 
Johnson, supra note 113, at 65 (describing how Twitter parody authors use differences between 
the bio, name, and profile picture features to communicate meaning). 
259. Johnson, supra note 113, at 66.  Additional tweets from the account that posted the 
allegedly defamatory tweet, for example, would require the user to navigate away from the time-
line to the allegedly defamatory tweet. 
260. Id. (displaying an image of a Twitter timeline).  Cf. Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns 
Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering how accessible content is from the alleg-
edly defamatory statement when determining whether it is relevant to the defamatory analysis). 
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; see, e.g., Kaelin, 162 F.3d at 
1041 (taking the minority approach to allegedly defamatory front-page headlines, reading them in 
the context of the internal article only when circumstances indicate that readers ordinarily would 
see the article). 
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tweet262 and the extra protection that courts seek to give parody which is 
often crucial to political speech,263 courts should consider the bio when in-
terpreting whether a tweet intended as parody is defamatory.  
The Levitt court did not consider the Levitt 2.0 bio, which states that 
the account is “[a] badass parody on our favorite lawyer,”264 when deter-
mining whether the tweets at issue were defamatory.  However, it consid-
ered similar content, namely an old tweet that Levitt 2.0 had posted which 
stated, “This is a parody account. You can find the real Todd(ler) 
@levittlaw.”265  Since the content of such disclaimer tweets is so similar to 
the content typically found in the Twitter bio, a more principled approach 
would be to consider the bio that the parody author likely hoped would fur-
nish their statements with meaning.266  
Furthermore, the same reasons for examining the bio as context for an 
allegedly defamatory tweet also support looking to other tweets in a thread.  
A thread is “a series of connected [t]weets from one person” that the author 
intends to be read together.267  When an allegedly defamatory statement is 
included in a tweet that is part of a thread, both courts and commentators 
have considered the additional content in the thread as relevant to interpret-
ing the statement at issue.268  In Levitt, because the tweets at issue did not 
involve a thread, the court should have only examined the bio under this 
Note’s approach.269  But in Feld v. Conway, a court considered the alleged-
                                                          
262. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that courts should consider content extrinsic 
to the tweet when analyzing whether it is defamatory since tweets are so short). 
263. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (describing how 
satirical cartoons of “Boss” Tweed ushered in the end of Gilded Age corruption). 
 264. @levittlawyer, supra note 1. 
265. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 
2016). 
266. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 66 (describing how Twitter parody authors utilize 
the bio as a tool to create meaning). 
267. How to Create a Thread on Twitter, supra note 245. 
268. See, e.g., Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (considering tweets 
in the same thread when interpreting an allegedly defamatory statement); see also Hunt, supra 
note 28, at 588–89 (advocating for courts to consider “contemporaneously” posted tweets when 
interpreting an allegedly defamatory statement). 
269. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *1. 
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ly defamatory statement contained within a Twitter thread in light of the 
thread as a whole, which made clear that the statement was merely “heat-
ed” rhetoric amid a debate.270  Because Twitter parody authors perform im-
portant political functions271 and are highly vulnerable to defamation liabil-
ity,272 courts should also consider allegedly defamatory tweets in the 
context of the tweeting account’s bio and tweets in the same thread. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Defamatory meaning analysis has always been a challenge, even 
when conveyed in traditional media.  Parody complicates the inquiry even 
more because it is so nuanced and dependent on context for its meaning.  
Add to the mix the new context of Twitter and the advent of online e-
personation criminal laws, and the stakes only increase.  As a result, courts 
must understand Twitter parody accounts, their relevant characteristics, and 
how reasonable Twitter users interpret context.   
As with front-page headlines, short tweets should be interpreted in the 
context of the extrinsic content relevant to its meaning.273  But courts need 
not get involved in overly time-consuming analyses of various tweets that 
are irrelevant.  Rather, courts should look at several identifying features of 
accounts that help real Twitter users understand meaning on the website 
and are either visible or easily accessible from the timeline.  In the context 
of e-personation, these same characteristics—the name of the account, the 
account handle, its bio, and profile picture—can also help to determine 
whether a fake account is sufficiently credible to constitute online imper-
sonation.  This Note also provides a springboard to analyze liability for al-
legedly defamatory speech on other interactive online platforms.274  Most 
                                                          
 270. Feld, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 4. 
271. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 61–62 (describing how parody Twitter ac-
counts are often created in the wake of political and social uprisings to rebel against systems of 
power). 
272. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 588–89; see also McCraw, supra note 49, at 94–95 (de-
scribing how “[t]he problem [with parody] is that statements of opinion, as well as parody and 
hyperbole, may be read to imply the existence of facts” absent contextual clues). 
273. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 274. See, e.g., Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 483–484 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding 
that the fair report privilege applied to a webpage because the “average reader” would click on a 
hyperlink to the news source, even though “one can verify a hyperlinked source’s content only 
through ‘external navigation’”).   
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of all, however, the proposed methodology seeks to facilitate the important 
political and social commentary that flows from Twitter parody accounts 
and reduce the chilling effects of crushing defamation liability. 
  
 
